शनिवार, 22 अक्तूबर 2016

Judgement of Apex Court has to be implemented and is not dependent on dismissal of review or curative petition

Board of Control for Cricket in India 
V.
Cricket Association of Bihar & Ors.

CJI T.S. Thakur, A.M. Khanwilkar & Dr. D. Y. Chandrachud, JJ.

Headnote

BCCI – JUSTICE LODHA COMMITTEE REPORT 
Non-compliance of recommendations of Justice Lodha Committee, which were approved with modification by Apex Court on 18.7.2016 - Status Report dated 26.9.2016 filed by Committee, showing repeated undermining of the Committee and Apex Court by BCCI with several statements and actions, which are grossly out of order and constitute contempt - Committee had issued directions that AGM of BCCI on 21.9.2016 may deal with any business or matter relating to 2016-17 only after adopting the Memorandum of Association (MOA) in pursuance of the recommen-dations of the Committee - Yet crores of rupees disbursed by BCCI in favour of state associations - Reason for non-compliance stated by BCCI was reluctance by State Association to subscribe to proposed MOA - Apex Court issued directions on 7.10.2016, noticing intransigence. Held, despite said order, intransigence has continued. Position of BCCI has not changed. However in larger interest, opportunity given to BCCI to establish its bonafide and demonstrate steps taken in compliance both before the Committee and Apex Court. BCCI will also secure compliance of State Associations. Additional directions issued including restraining BCCI from making any disbursement of funds to state association. 

Ed.: For directions, please refer to para 20. 
Recommendations of Justice Lodha Committee, directed by Apex Court to be implemented within 4 months or at best 6 months vide judgement dated 18.7.2016 - BCCI's grievance that Committee has hastened the process by specifying timelines for completion even within the said period. Held, Committee was given the task to supervise implementation of recommendation and was specifically permitted to lay down timelines. Implementation process being a continuous process, requiring monitoring, could not be completed in one instalment and required timelines. Even otherwise, if BCCI had such grievance, it should have approached the Committee. (Paras 12-15) 

Recommendations of Justice Lodha Committee - While approving the recommendations, Apex Court vide order dated 18.7.2016, directed nominee of CAG to be inducted as part of management of BCCI - Thereafter in an interview Mr. Richardson of ICC stated that President of BCCI has sought a letter from ICC to the effect that appointment of such nominee of CAG would amount to 'Governmental Interference' - BCCI denying this fact but president admitted it in his affidavit. Held, it is a matter of serious concern that despite accepting final judgement dated 18.7.2016, President of BCCI sought such a declaration. In this regard it is important to ascertain the veracity of statements of Mr. Manohar, Chairman of BCCI, Mr. Richardson and Mr. Shetty, General Manager Admn. & Game Development. Chairman directed to file his response. (Paras 5-11) 

PRACTICE & PROCEDURE 
Binding effect - Judgement of Apex Court accepting recommendations of Justice Lodha Committee - Whether recommendations would be binding only when review petition and curative petitions are dismissed as stated by BCCI to working Committee. Held, no. Such a view is misconceived. Judgement of Apex Court has to be implemented and is not dependent on dismissal of review or curative petition. (Para 14) 

Held

Learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of BCCI has stated that in respect of some of the recommendations, where state associations have not agreed to implement the recommendations of the Committee, as accepted by this Court, BCCI will make a genuine endeavour to persuade the state associations to effectuate compliance. Though BCCI is in default and breach of the directions of this Court, in order to enable it to have an additional opportunity to establish its bona fides and to secure compliance with the judgment of this Court dated 18 July 2016, we grant time until 3 December 2016 for the purpose. Besides complying with the direction set out above of filing statements and appearing before the Committee, BCCI shall report compliance before this Court on 5 December 2016. (Para 18)

For the reasons which have been contained in the present order of the Court, we are of the view that the issuance of certain additional directions has become inevitable, over and above those that are contained in the previous order dated 7 October 2016. We have presently come to the conclusion that, prima facie, there is substance in the status report submitted by the Committee. Implementation of the final judgment of this Court dated 18 July 2016 has prima facie been impeded by the intransigence of BCCI and its office bearers. However, having due regard to the submission made on behalf of BCCI that it would make every genuine effort to persuade the state associations to secure compliance with the judgment of this Court, and having regard to the larger interests of the game of cricket, we are desisting from issuing a direction at this stage in terms of the request made by the Committee for appointment of administrators so as to enable BCCI to demonstrate its good faith and the steps taken for compliance both before the Committee in the first instance and before this Court by the next date of hearing. However, certain additional directions are warranted in the interest of maintaining transparency in the functioning of BCCI, having regard to the sequence of events after 18 July 2016. (Para 19)

ORDER

Dr. D.Y. CHANDRACHUD, J.

1.  On 7 October 2016, directions were issued by this Court pursuant to a status report dated 26 September 2016, submitted by the Committee consisting of Justice R M Lodha, Justice Ashok Bhan and Justice R.V. Raveendran. The status report filed by the Committee set out the sequence of events that had taken place after the final judgment and order of this Court dated 18 July 2016, which accepted the report submitted by the Committee on 18 December 2015 with certain modifications. A gist of the status report has been set out in the earlier order dated 7 October 2016. After adverting to the sequence of events, the Committee has concluded that BCCI has violated its directions:

  “…Directions of this Hon’ble Court have been ignored, actions have been taken to present a fait accompli to the Committee, the directives of the Committee have been breached, and member associations have not been duly intimated about the directions of the Committee and the timelines fixed by it.”

1.1. The Committee has observed that“BCCI has repeatedly taken steps to undermine the Committee and this Court”, with several statements and actions which “are grossly out of order and would even constitute contempt”. The Committee noted that despite several e-mails, as well as a direction to appear before it on 9 August 2016, the President of BCCI did not furnish even a single response to the Committee. The Committee also observed that the President of BCCI had even gone to the extent of requesting ICC to issue a letter that“this Committee amounts to governmental interference” besides making several objectionable statements in the press which undermined both the Court and the Committee.

2. The Committee submitted the above status report in pursuance of the directions contained in the judgment of this Court dated 18 July 2016. This Court had by its judgment, while accepting the recommendations made in the earlier report of the Committee, assigned to the Committee a supervisory role for ensuring the transition from the old to the new system recommended by the Committee. While this Court in its judgment expressed a hope that the process of implementing the directions contained in the judgment would be completed within a period of four months or at best six months, the Committee was requested to draw appropriate timelines for the implementation of the recommendations and to supervise the implementation process. The Committee, while moving the status report observed that though the office bearers of BCCI had furnished assurances to it on 9 August 2016, 25 August 2016 and 20 September 2016, that they would cooperate with the Committee in fulfilling the directions of this Court (subject to any modification or review) these assurances had not been fulfilled.

3.  In the previous Order of this Court dated 7 October 2016, the followingprima facie, findings were recorded:-

  “… The sequence of events that have been taken place since 18th July, 2016 and referred to in the status report prima facie give an impression that BCCI has far from lending its fullest cooperation to the Committee adopted an obstructionist and at times a defiant attitude which the Committee has taken note of and described as an impediment undermining not only the Committee but even the dignity of this Court with several statements and actions which according to the Committee are grossly out of order and may even constitute contempt”.

3.1. This Court has noted that in spite of a direction issued by the Committee on 21 August 2016 that the AGM of BCCI which was to be held on 21 September 2016, may transact only routine business for 2015-16 and that any business or matter relating to 2016-17 may be dealt with only after the adoption of the Memorandum of Association and rules in pursuance of the recommendations of the Committee, substantial amounts running into crores of rupees have been disbursed in favour of state associations. This Court expressed the view that BCCI could and indeed ought to have avoided the disbursement of such a huge amount while the Committee was still examining the need for formulating a disbursement policy.

4.  During the course of the hearing which resulted in the earlier order dated 7 October 2016, BCCI stated that one of the reasons for its failure to adopt the proposed MOA was the reluctance of the state associations to subscribe to it. In this background, this Court observed that if that be the position, there is no reason why the state associations that are opposed to the reforms suggested by the Committee and accepted by this Court should either expect or draw any benefit from the release of grants by BCCI. The following directions have been issued by this Court on 7 October 2016:-

  “i) No further amount in terms of the Resolution passed in AGM on 09.11.2015 or any subsequent resolution by the BCCI or its Working Committee shall be disbursed to any State Association except where the State Association concerned passes a proper resolution to the effect that it is agreeable to undertake and to support the reforms as proposed and accepted by this Court in letter and spirit. Upon such a Resolution being passed, a copy of the same shall be filed before Justice Lodha Committee with an affidavit of the President of the State Association concerned unequivocally undertaking to abide by the reforms as proposed by the Committee and accepted and modified by this Court. A similar affidavit with a copy of the Resolution shall be filed before this Court also. It is only after such affidavits are filed, that BCCI may transfer the balance amount of Rs.16.73 crores each payable to the State Association.

  As regards the 13 State Associations to whom the payment has already been disbursed, we direct that the State Association concerned shall not appropriate the said amount except after they have passed a resolution and filed an affidavit as mentioned above before Justice Lodha Committee and before this Court. In case the affidavits are not filed, the amount disbursed to the State Associations shall be invested by the Associations in a term deposit subject to further directions of this Court.

  ii) Mr. Ratnakar Shivaram Shetty, General Manager, Admin and Game development shall, in the meantime, place on record a copy of the authorization/resolution passed by the BCCI on the basis of which he has filed the affidavit supporting the response of the BCCI to the status report.

  iii) Mr. Anurag Thakur, President of the BCCI shall file a personal affidavit whether he had asked the CEO of the ICC to state that the appointment of Justice Lodha Committee was tantamount to Government interference in the working of the BCCI.

  iv) Mr. Arvind Datar, learned Senior Counsel to produce the original record on the basis of which the affidavit by Mr. Ratnakar Shivaram Shetty on behalf of BCCI has been filed”.

5.  In pursuance of these directions, Mr Anurag Thakur, President of BCCI has filed an affidavit specifically with reference to direction (iii) above. Before we consider the affidavit that has been filed by the President of BCCI, it is necessary to advert to the response to the status report of the Committee filed by Mr. Ratnakar Shivaram Shetty, General Manager, Admn. & Game Development, BCCI. In the sequence of events set out in his response to the status report, Mr Shetty has dealt with the statement made in an interview given to the electronic media by Mr David Richardson, CEO of ICC. Mr Richardson stated that the President of BCCI sought a letter from ICC that the appointment of a nominee of CAG (which has been directed by this Court on 18 July 2016 in terms of the Committee’s recommendations) would amount to ‘governmental interference’ thereby inviting the suspension of BCCI from the membership of ICC. Mr Shetty’s response was as follows:

  “It appears that an interview was given by Mr David Richardson the ICC CEO falsely stating that the BCCI President had requested the ICC to issue a letter stating that the intervention by this Hon’ble Court amounted to Governmental interference. It is submitted that no such letter or oral request was ever made to the said gentleman either by the BCCI President or any office bearer of the BCCI. It is apparent that Mr. Richardson has confused himself in relation to the issue. This issue is required to be considered in the light of the fact that Mr. Shashank Manohar Senior Advocate had clearly opined as the BCCI President that appointment of the CAG in the BCCI shall result in suspension of the BCCI as it would constitute governmental interference. In fact the same had been submitted on affidavit before this Hon’ble Court. However, as Chairman of the ICC, Mr. Manohar had taken a contrary stand and stated that it would not amount to governmental interference. It was in this context that a discussion took place between Mr. Shashank Manohar and Mr. Anurag Thakur during a meeting in Dubai wherein a clarification as sought by Mr. Anurag Thakur during an informal discussion on what the exact status would be if the CAG was inducted by the BCCI as part of its management and whether it would amount to governmental interference as had been advised and affirmed by Mr. Manohar during his stint as BCCI President.”

5.1. Paragraph 7(d) of the response contains a statement that:

  “It is being incorrectly alleged that the President BCCI made a request to the ICC to issue a letter stating that this Committee amounts to Governmental interference. This suggestion is denied”.

6.  In the affidavit which has been filed by the President of BCCI on 15 October 2016, there is a denial that any such request was made by him to the CEO of ICC. Paragraph 3 of the affidavit contains the version of the President of what transpired at Dubai on 6/7 August 2016 during the course of a meeting convened by ICC:

  “In this context it is respectfully submitted that there was an ICC governance review committee meeting scheduled to be held in Dubai on 6th & 7th August 2016. There were certain issues relating to financial model for which my inputs were required and as such I was invited by ICC for the said meeting. During the meeting with regard to the review of the constitutional provisions of ICC, I pointed out to the Chairman of the ICC, Mr. Shashank Manohar that when he was the President of BCCI he had taken a view that the recommendations of the Justice Lodha committee appointing the nominee of the CAG on the Apex Council would amount to governmental interference and might invoke an action of suspension from ICC. I therefore requested him that he being the ICC Chairman can a letter be issued clarifying the position which he had taken as BCCI President. Mr. Manohar explained to me at the meeting that when the stand was taken by him, the matter was pending before this Hon’ble Court and had not been decided. However, on 18.07.2016 this Hon’ble Court delivered its judgment in the matter. In the said judgment, this Hon’ble Court has rejected the submission that the appointment of the nominee of CAG on Apex council would amount to Governmental interference and had also held that the ICC would appreciate the appointment as it would bring transparency in the finances of the Board.”

7. Mr Kapil Sibal, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the BCCI has tendered during the course of hearing draft minutes of a Working Committee meeting of BCCI held on 22 August 2016. The draft minutes purportedly contain a record of what is stated to have transpired between Mr Shashank Manohar, the Chairperson of ICC and the President of BCCI at the meeting on 6 and 7 August 2016. The relevant part is extracted below:-

  “Mr. Anurag Thakur was in the Chair and called the meeting to order and welcomed the members. He briefed the members about his meeting with the ICC Chairman at Dubai during the ICC governance review committee meeting on 6th & 7th August 2016. Certain financial mode inputs were required during the said meeting which he gave. During the meeting with regard to the review of the constitutional provisions of ICC it was informed by Mr. Thakur that he asked Chairman ICC Mr. Shashank Manohar that when he was the President of BCCI he had taken a view that the recommendations of Justice Lodha committee appointing the nominee of the CAG on the Apex Council would amount to governmental interference and might invoke an action of suspension from ICC. It was therefore requested from him that he being the ICC Chairman could a letter be issued clarifying the position which he had taken as BCCI President. Mr. Manohar thereafter explained that when the stand was taken by him the matter was pending before the Supreme Court and was not decided. However on 18th of July 2016 the Hon. Supreme Court of India delivered its judgment and the Court has rejected the submission that the appointment of the nominee of CAG on Apex council will amount to Governmental interference and had also held that the ICC would appreciate the appointment as it would bring transparency in the finances of the Board. The discussion stopped in view of his explanation on this issue”.

8.  Prima facie, it appears from the response that was filed by BCCI to the status report, that a clarification was sought by Mr Anurag Thakur from Mr Shashank Manohar on what the exact status would be if a nominee of CAG was inducted by BCCI as part of its management and whether it would amount to governmental interference. The statement made by BCCI in its response to the status report contains a denial that its President made a request to ICC to issue a letter stating that the Committee amounted to governmental interference. However, in the affidavit which has since been filed by the President of BCCI in pursuance of the Court’s directions of 7 October 2016, it has been accepted that he had made a request to the Chairman of ICC for issuing a letter“clarifying the position which he had taken as BCCI President” (to the effect that the recommendations of the Committee for appointing a nominee of CAG would amount to governmental interference and might invoke an action for suspension from ICC). Significantly, Mr Shetty did not in the response filed earlier by BCCI to the status report disclose that there was a request for a letter by its President to the Chairman, ICC.

9.  The draft minutes of the Working Committee purportedly dated 22 August 2016, a copy of which has been placed on the record, are in tandem with the statement made by Mr Thakur on affidavit. Prima facie, it appears that the draft minutes were not before Mr Shetty when he made a statement on behalf of BCCI in his response to the status report. If the draft minutes were before him, it would be natural to assume that the disclosure which has now emerged in pursuance of the order of this Court dated 7 October 2016 would have been contained in the response submitted by Mr Shetty to the status report. Mr Shetty has stated that the response filed by BCCI to the status report was based on information derived from the records. If that be so, the purported draft minutes of the Working Committee could not have missed his attention or knowledge.

10. Be that as it may, it is a matter of serious concern that the President of BCCI, even after the declaration of the final judgment and order of this Court dated 18 July 2016, requested the Chairperson of ICC for a letter “clarifying” (as he states) the position which he had taken as BCCI President to the effect that the induction of a CAG nominee would amount to governmental interference and may result in BCCI being suspended from ICC. There was no occasion for the President of BCCI to do so once the recommendation of the Committee for the induction of a CAG nominee was accepted in the final judgment of this Court. In the judgment of this Court dated 18 May 2016, this Court observed as follows:-

  “77. There is, in our view, no basis for the argument that any measure taken by the BCCI on its own or under the direction of a competent court specially when aimed at streamlining its working and ensuring financial discipline, transparency and accountability expected of an organization discharging public functions such as BCCI may be seen as governmental interference calling for suspension/derecognition of the BCCI. Far from finding fault with presence of a nominee of the Accountant General of the State and C&AG, the ICC would in our opinion appreciate any such step for the same would prevent misgivings about the working of the BCCI especially in relation to management of its funds and bring transparency and objectivity necessary to inspire public confidence in the fairness and the effective management of the affairs of the BCCI and the State Associations. The nominees recommended by the Committee would act as conscience keepers of the State Association and BCCI in financial matters and matters related or incidental thereto which will in no way adversely impact the performance or working of the BCCI for the promotion and development of the game of cricket. The criticism levelled against the recommendations of the Committee is, therefore, unfounded and accordingly rejected”.

11. This finding which is contained in the final judgment and order of this Court binds BCCI. Prima facie, an effort has been made by the President of BCCI to create a record in order to question the legitimacy of the recommendation of the Committee for the appointment of a CAG nominee after the recommendation was accepted by this Court on 18 July 2016. We presently defer further consideration of the action to be taken with reference to his conduct. Mr Shetty in his response to the status report claims that the CEO of ICC had “falsely” stated in his interview that the President of BCCI had requested ICC to issue a letter stating that the intervention of this Court amounted to governmental interference. The version of Mr Shetty is at variance to what is alleged to have been stated by the CEO of ICC. It may also become necessary for this Court to assess the veracity of the version of Mr Shetty and that of Mr Richardson. Mr Shashank Manohar, the then President of BCCI is presently the Chairman of ICC. A copy of this order shall be forwarded to him by the Secretary to the Committee in order to enable him to consider filing a response setting out his version, to set the record straight and assist this Court. Mr Manohar is at liberty to obtain a report from Mr Richardson before filing his response.

12. During the course of hearing, a grievance has been made on behalf of BCCI that though in the judgment of this Court dated 18 July 2016, it had been hoped that the process of implementing the reforms suggested by the Committee “should be completed within a period of four months or at best six months from today”, the Committee has hastened the process by indicating timelines for completion even within the said period. We find that the criticism of the Committee is not justified for more than one reason. Though this Court expressed the hope that the process of transition and implementation be completed within four months or at best within six months, this Court left it open to the Committee to draw “appropriate timelines for implementation of the recommendations” and to supervise the implementation thereof. The Committee which was entrusted with the task of supervising the implementation process was permitted to lay down suitable timelines. The process of implementation requires a continuous process of monitoring and supervision and it would be only reasonable to assume, as did the Committee, that the process could not be completed in one instalment. Hence, the Committee laid down timelines for implementation.

13. Hence, the broad framework of time prescribed by this Court does not preclude the Committee from specifying timelines. On the contrary, the Committee was specifically allowed to do so to implement the judgment. The status report contains a record of proceedings before the Committee dated 9 August 2016 which indicates that when the first set of timelines was handed over to BCCI’s Secretary on 9 August 2016, he stated before the Committee that a report of compliance would be furnished by 25 August 2016. Despite this, in the report dated 25 August 2016, submitted by the Secretary, BCCI to the Committee there appears the following statement furnished by BCCI by way of a clarification at the Working Committee meeting held on 22 August 2016:

  “2 The Members queried as regards to the status of the review petition filed by the BCCI. It was clarified to the members that if the review petition as well as curative petition was dismissed, the recommendations of the Lodha Committee, save those as amended by the court would become binding”.

14. The statement made on behalf of BCCI to the Working Committee that it was only if the Review Petition, as well as Curative Petition were to be dismissed that the recommendations of the Committee would be binding is patently misconceived. The recommendations of the Committee were endorsed in a final judgment and order of this Court dated 18 July 2016, subject to certain modifications. The judgment of this Court has to be implemented as it stands. A party to a litigation cannot be heard to say that it would treat a judgment of this Court as not having binding effect unless the Review or Curative Petitions that it has filed are dismissed.

15. For the reasons which have weighed with us in the earlier order of this Court dated 7 October 2016 and for those which we have adduced above, we are inclined to take a serious view of the conduct of BCCI in the present case. Despite the prima facie findings which were arrived at in the previous order, the further hearing was deferred. There has been no change in the position of BCCI. The intransigence continues. If BCCI had any difficulties about adhering to the timelines laid down by the Committee, the appropriate course would have been to move the Committee. Even the grievance which was urged during this proceeding by BCCI, that some of the directions of the Committee have travelled beyond the parameters set by this Court can and ought to be urged before the Committee in the first instance.

16. During the course of the hearing, Shri Kapil Sibal, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of BCCI has agreed to a course of action whereby in the first instance, BCCI would establish its bona fides before the Committee by demonstrating the compliance made by it of those recommendations which are stated to have been fulfilled. The Committee as the body appointed by this Court to monitor and supervise implementation of the judgment will verify whether there has been full compliance with the directions which are stated by BCCI to have been fulfilled.

17. The President and Secretary of BCCI shall (within two weeks) file before the Committee on affidavit their statements of the compliance effected by BCCI thus far of those recommendations which have been fulfilled. The statement shall contain an elaboration of the manner in which compliance has been made and the steps proposed to be taken to fulfil the remaining directions of this Court. The Committee is at liberty to verify the compliance statements filed on behalf of BCCI by its President and Secretary. Both the President and the Secretary shall appear before the Committee in person, and explain the steps taken for compliance and the course of action to be adopted hereafter.

18. Learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of BCCI has stated that in respect of some of the recommendations, where state associations have not agreed to implement the recommendations of the Committee, as accepted by this Court, BCCI will make a genuine endeavour to persuade the state associations to effectuate compliance. Though BCCI is in default and breach of the directions of this Court, in order to enable it to have an additional opportunity to establish its bona fidesand to secure compliance with the judgment of this Court dated 18 July 2016, we grant time until 3 December 2016 for the purpose. Besides complying with the direction set out above of filing statements and appearing before the Committee, BCCI shall report compliance before this Court on 5 December 2016.

19. For the reasons which have been contained in the present order of the Court, we are of the view that the issuance of certain additional directions has become inevitable, over and above those that are contained in the previous order dated 7 October 2016. We have presently come to the conclusion that, prima facie, there is substance in the status report submitted by the Committee. Implementation of the final judgment of this Court dated 18 July 2016 hasprima facie been impeded by the intransigence of BCCI and its office bearers. However, having due regard to the submission made on behalf of BCCI that it would make every genuine effort to persuade the state associations to secure compliance with the judgment of this Court, and having regard to the larger interests of the game of cricket, we are desisting from issuing a direction at this stage in terms of the request made by the Committee for appointment of administrators so as to enable BCCI to demonstrate its good faith and the steps taken for compliance both before the Committee in the first instance and before this Court by the next date of hearing. However, certain additional directions are warranted in the interest of maintaining transparency in the functioning of BCCI, having regard to the sequence of events after 18 July 2016.

20. We accordingly issue the following additional directions:-

  (i) BCCI shall forthwith cease and desist from making any disbursement of funds for any purpose whatsoever to any state association until and unless the state association concerned adopts a resolution undertaking to implement the recommendations of the Committee as accepted by this Court in its judgment dated 18 July 2016. After such a resolution is passed and before any disbursement of funds takes place to the state association concerned, a copy of the resolution shall be filed before the Committee and before this Court, together with an affidavit of the President of the state association undertaking to abide by the reforms contained in the report of the Committee, as modified by this Court. Any transfer of funds shall take place to the state associations which have accepted these terms only after compliance as above is effected. This direction is in addition to the previous direction of 7 October 2016 in regard to the disbursement to and appropriation by the state associations;

  (ii) (a) The Committee appointed by this Court is requested to appoint an independent auditor to scrutinise and audit the income received and expenditure incurred by BCCI; (b) The auditor shall also oversee the tendering process that will hereinafter be undertaken by BCCI, as well as the award of contracts above a threshold value to be fixed by the Committee; (c)The award of contracts by BCCI above the threshold fixed by the Committee shall be subject to the prior approval of the Committee; (d) The Committee shall be at liberty to obtain the advice of the auditors on the fairness of the tendering process which has been adopted by BCCI and in regard to all relevant facts and circumstances; (e)The Committee will determine whether a proposed contract above the threshold value should or should not be approved; and (f) The Committee will be at liberty to formulate the terms of engagement and reference to the auditors having regard to the above directions. BCCI shall defray the costs, charges and expenses of the auditors.

  (iii) The President and Secretary of BCCI shall within two weeks from today file a statement on affidavit indicating compliance made by BCCI of those of the recommendations of the Committee which have been complied with, the manner of compliance and the steps adopted for securing compliance with the remaining recommendations. They shall appear before the Committee to explain the manner of compliance. The President and Secretary, BCCI shall also keep the Committee apprised about the steps taken pursuant to the statement recorded in paragraph 18 above.

  (iv) An affidavit of compliance shall be filed before this Court on or before 3 December 2016 by the President and Secretary to BCCI in terms of paragraphs 17 and 18 above; and

  (v) The Secretary to the Committee appointed by this Court shall forward a copy of this order to Mr Shashank Manohar, Chairman ICC to facilitate the observations contained in paragraph 11 of this order. 

20.1. BCCI shall cooperate with the Committee and with the auditors by granting, in particular, full access to records, accounts and other information as required to facilitate implementation of these directions.

21. The hearing of the proceedings shall stand over to 5 December 2016.

authority competent to remove at the time when offence was allegedly committed, can grant sanction.

Vivek Batra 
V.
Union of India and others 

Ranjan Gogoi & Prafulla C. Pant, JJ.

Headnote

PREVENTION OF CORRUPTION 
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 
Section 19 - Sanction to prosecute, Appellant, a public servant - Central Vigilance Commission (CVC) recommended grant of sanction - Competent authority, Finance Minister, remitted the matter back - When CVC reiterated its opinion, Finance Department referred the matter to Department of Personnel and Training (DoPT), taking the stand that sanction should be granted only when CBI provides sufficient evidence - Said stand not liked by DoPT, however it opined that appellant be warned - Later DoPT stated that insufficiency of evidence can be tested in court and sanction be granted - Thereafter Competent authority (Finance minister) granted sanction - Whether finance department having once remitted the matter to CVC, declined sanction. Held, decision not to grant sanction was never taken by competent authority, thus it cannot be viewed as review of earlier order. Though different authorities opined differently before competent authority took a decision, that cannot be a reason to hold sanction invalid. There was proper application of mind by competent authority before granting sanction. Opinion of CVC, which was reaffirmed, ultimately prevailed. Appeal dismissed. Bachhittar Singh, Jasbir Singh Chhabra [JT 2010 (2) SC 637], Sethi Auto Service Station [JT 2008 (11) SC 520] relied. 

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 
Section 19 - Grant of sanction to prosecute public servant - Who is the Competent authority. Held, Sanction is required from Central Government or State Government, as the case may be. Where a public servant is neither employed in connection with affairs of Union or the State, then authority competent to remove him at the time when offence was allegedly committed, can grant sanction. 

Section 19 - Grant of sanction - Competent authority for an IRS officer, held, is the Finance Minister. Bachhittar Singh v. State of Punjab, referred. (Para 7) 

Section 19 - Relevancy of opinion of CVC in according sanction. Held, its opinion is relevant as under clause (g) of Section 8 of Central Vigilance Commission Act, 2003, as it is one of the functions of CVC to tender advice to Central Government on such matters as may be referred to it by the Government. (Para 11) 

Held

In view of the law laid down by this Court, as above, we are of the opinion that the sanction cannot be held invalid only for the reason that in the administrative notings different authorities have opined differently before the competent authority took the decision in the matter. It is not a case where the Finance Minister was not the competent authority to grant the sanction. (Para 10)

Having gone through the copy of note-sheets relating to sanction in question placed before us as part of rejoinder affidavit, it is evident that there had been proper application of mind on the part of the competent authority before the sanction was accorded. Our perusal of the said record does not indicate that any decision was taken by the competent authority, at any point of time, not to grant sanction so as to give the decision to grant sanction the colour of a review of any such earlier order, as has been contended before us. The opinion of CVC, which was reaffirmed and ultimately prevailed in according the sanction, cannot be said to be irrelevant for the reason that clause (g) of Section 8 of the Central Vigilance Commission Act, 2003 provides that it is one of the functions of the CVC to tender advice to the Central Government on such matters as may be referred to it by the Government. (Para 11)

What is required under Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 is that for taking the cognizance of an offence, punishable under Sections 7, 10, 11, 13 and 15 of the Act committed by the public servant, sanction is necessary by the Central Government or the State Government, as the case may be, and in the case of a public servant, who is neither employed in connection with affairs of the Union or the State, from the authority competent to remove him. Sub-section (2) of Section 19 of the Act provides that where for any reason whatsoever any doubt arises as to whether the previous sanction, as required under sub-section (1) should be given by the Central Government or the State Government or any authority, such sanction shall be given by that Government or authority which could have been competent to remove the public servant from his office at the time when the offence was alleged to have been committed. (Para 10)

Cases Referred

1.Jasbir Singh Chhabra and others v. State of Punjab and others [JT 2010 (2) SC 637] (Para 8) 

2.Sethi Auto Service Station and another v. Delhi Development Authority and others [JT 2008 (11) SC 520] (Para 9) 

3.Bachhittar Singh v. The State of Punjab [1962 Supp. 3 SCR 713] (Para 7) 

4.Nazir Ahmad v. King-Emperor [AIR 1936 PC 253] (Para 4)

Prafulla C. Pant, J.

1. This appeal is directed against judgment and order dated 29.10.2013, passed by the High Court of Judicature at Bombay in Criminal Writ Petition No. 3654 of 2012, whereby the petition challenging the sanction dated 09.10.2012 for prosecution of the appellant under Section 13 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 is dismissed.

2. Brief facts of the case are that the appellant is an officer of cadre of Indian Revenue Service (for short “IRS”), who entered into the service through 1992 batch. It is stated that an FIR RC No. BA1/2005/A0017 was registered on 04.04.2005 by Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) (Respondent No. 4) in respect of disproportionate assets to the known sources of the appellant. The prosecution case is that the appellant has amassed the assets valued at Rs.1,27,38,353/- in his name and in the names of his wife and minor son during the check period 04.01.1993 to 31.03.2004, which is disproportionate to the known sources of his income. The investigation took almost six years to get completed, which revealed that a sum of Rs.56,30,296/- was invested by the appellant through Benami transactions in the names of his wife and son in two companies, namely, M/s. ARJ Impex Private Limited and M/s. Malik Hospitality Services Private Limited. According to CBI, the appellant’s wife Priyanka Batra incorporated a company, M/s. ARJ Impex Limited, to engage in import-export business, and then sold her shares in the company to her two uncles, namely, Karan Singh and Vijay Kumar. The company’s main source of income was unsecured loans obtained from various companies and individuals, many of which were never paid back, several of these loans were from Priyanka Batra herself. Further, though the sale of income of the company was minimal, it acquired assets of Rs.85,70,770/- during the check period. It appears that Karan Singh and Vijay Kumar had incorporated another company called M/s. Malik Hospitality Services, whose main source of income was unsecured loans from various individuals and companies. The company had acquired assets of Rs.20,52,013/- and had unrepaid loans of Rs.26,77,000/- during the check period. Priyanka Batra was connected to Malik Hospitality Services as a public notice appeared in Nav Bharat Times, showing her as the intended purchaser of a property that was to be bought for the company.

3. The appellant was arrested on 02.09.2010, and after about three days released on bail. He was placed under suspension by the authority concerned. The CBI sought sanction for prosecution of the appellant from the competent authority on which the file was processed, and at the first stage on 03.05.2011 advice of Central Vigilance Commission (CVC) was sought by the Finance Department. On 01.09.2011, the CVC recommended that the sanction for prosecution be granted. The department concerned (Finance Department) endorsed the matter again on 01.11.2011 for fresh opinion of the CVC. But the CVC, through its Office Memorandum dated 02.11.2011, reiterated its opinion. The Finance Department thereafter referred the matter to Department of Personnel and Training (for short “DOPT”) for its views. The DOPT did not appreciate the stand of the Finance Department that the sanction should be accorded only if the CBI provides sufficient evidence and communicated the same through letter dated 29.03.2012. However, it observed that administrative warning could be issued to the appellant for not intimating the transactions to Finance Department. Through letter dated 28.05.2012, the DOPT conveyed that insufficiency of evidence can be tested in the court of law and sanction for prosecution can be granted. Finally, the competent authority, vide its order dated 09.10.2012, granted sanction for prosecution of the appellant, who challenged the same before the High Court in the writ petition, which was dismissed by the impugned order.

4. Mr. K.K. Venugopal, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant, argued that there was categorical opinion of the Finance Department that the evidence laid before it was not sufficient to grant sanction for prosecution. It is pointed out that there was difference of opinion between Finance Ministry and the CVC. Not only this, even DOPT opined that warning to the officer could be sufficient. It is further submitted that the earlier competent authority (Finance Minister, Government of India) had referred the matter back to the CVC, as such, the sanction for prosecution stood declined, and grant of the sanction by the successor Finance Minister cannot be said to be a valid sanction for prosecution. It is further argued that the Rules of Business are not followed, as such, it cannot be said that the sanction was accorded by the competent authority. In support of his argument learned senior counsel placed reliance on Nazir Ahmad v. King-Emperor [AIR 1936 PC 253], and argued that where a power is given to do a certain thing in a certain way, the thing must be done in that way or not at all.

5. We have considered the submissions of learned senior counsel, and perused the record.

6. Before further discussion, we thing it just and proper to quote relevant part of Government of India (Allocation of Business) Rules, 1961. Sub-rules (3) and (4) of Rule 3 of the Rules read as under: -

  “(3) Where sanction for the prosecution of any person for any offence is required to be accorded –

  (a) If he is a Government servant, by the Department which is the Cadre Controlling authority for the service of which he is a member, and in any other case, by the Department in which he was working at the time of commission of the alleged offence;

  (b) If he is a public servant other than a Government servant, appointed by the Central Government, by the Department administratively concerned with the organization in which he was working at the time of commission of the alleged offence; and

  (c) In any other case, by the Department which administers the Act under which the alleged offence is committed;

  Provided that where, for offences alleged to have been committed, sanction is required under more than one Act, it shall be competent for the Department which administers any of such Acts to accord sanction under all such Acts.

  (4) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-rule (3), the President may, by general or special order, direct that in any case or class of case, the sanction shall be by the Department of Personnel and Training.”

7. There is no dispute that for an IRS officer Cadre Controlling Authority is the Finance Minister of the Government of India. In Bachhittar Singh v. The State of Punjab [1962 Supp. 3 SCR 713], Constitution Bench of this Court has held that the business of the State is a complicated one and has necessarily to be conducted through the agency of large number of officials and authorities. 

8. In Jasbir Singh Chhabra and others v. State of Punjab and others [JT 2010 (2) SC 637 : 2010 
(4) SCC 192], this Court held as under: -

  “35. It must always be remembered that in a democratic polity like ours, the functions of the Government are carried out by different individuals at different levels. The issues and policy matters which are required to be decided by the Government are dealt with by several functionaries some of whom may record notings on the files favouring a particular person or group of persons. Someone may suggest a particular line of action, which may not be conducive to public interest and others may suggest adoption of a different mode in larger public interest. However, the final decision is required to be taken by the designated authority keeping in view the larger public interest. The notings recorded in the files cannot be made basis for recording a finding that the ultimate decision taken by the Government is tainted by mala fides or is influenced by extraneous considerations……”

9. In Sethi Auto Service Station and another v. Delhi Development Authority and others [JT 2008 (11) SC 520 : 2009 (1) SCC 180], this Court observed as under:-

  “14. It is trite to state that notings in a departmental file do not have the sanction of law to be an effective order. A noting by an officer is an expression of his viewpoint on the subject. It is no more than an opinion by an officer for internal use and consideration of the other officials of the department and for the benefit of the final decision-making authority. Needless to add that internal notings are not meant for outside exposure. Notings in the file culminate into an executable order, affecting the rights of the parties, only when it reaches the final decision-making authority in the department, gets his approval and the final order is communicated to the person concerned.”

10. In view of the law laid down by this Court, as above, we are of the opinion that the sanction cannot be held invalid only for the reason that in the administrative notings different authorities have opined differently before the competent authority took the decision in the matter. It is not a case where the Finance Minister was not the competent authority to grant the sanction. What is required under Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 is that for taking the cognizance of an offence, punishable under Sections 7, 10, 11, 13 and 15 of the Act committed by the public servant, is necessary by the Central Government or the State Government, as the case may be, and in the case of a public servant, who is neither employed in connection with affairs of the Union or the State, from the authority competent to remove him. Sub-section (2) of Section 19 of the Act provides that where for any reason whatsoever any doubt arises as to whether the previous sanction, as required under sub-section (1) should be given by the Central Government or the State Government or any authority, such sanction shall be given by that Government or authority which could have been competent to remove the public servant from his office at the time when the offence was alleged to have been committed. Sub-section (3) of Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 provides as under: -

  “(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), -

  (a) no finding, sentence or order passed by a special Judge shall be reversed or altered by a court in appeal, confirmation or revision on the ground of the absence of, or any error, omission or irregularity in, the sanction required under sub-section (1), unless in the opinion of that court, a failure of justice has in fact been occasioned thereby;

  (b) no court shall stay the proceedings under this Act on the ground of any error, omission or irregularity in the sanction granted by the authority, unless it is satisfied that such error, omission or irregularity has resulted in a failure of justice;

  (c) no court shall stay the proceedings under this Act on any other ground and no court shall exercise the powers of revision in relation to any interlocutory order passed in any inquiry, trial, appeal or other proceedings.”

11. Having gone through the copy of note-sheets relating to sanction in question placed before us as part of rejoinder affidavit, it is evident that there had been proper application of mind on the part of the competent authority before the sanction was accorded. Our perusal of the said record does not indicate that any decision was taken by the competent authority, at any point of time, not to grant sanction so as to give the decision to grant sanction the colour of a review of any such earlier order, as has been contended before us. The opinion of CVC, which was reaffirmed and ultimately prevailed in according the sanction, cannot be said to be irrelevant for the reason that clause (g) of Section 8 of the Central Vigilance Commission Act, 2003 provides that it is one of the functions of the CVC to tender advice to the Central Government on such matters as may be referred to it by the Government.

12. For the reasons, as discussed above, we find no reason to interfere with the impugned order passed by the High Court dismissing the writ petition. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed. The interim order dated 25.11.2014, passed by this Court, is hereby vacated. The trial court is directed to conclude the trial expeditiously. However, we clarify that we have not given any opinion as to the merits of the case. There shall be no order as to costs.

मंगलवार, 18 अक्तूबर 2016

भगतसिंह : कुछ अधखुले पन्ने > व्योमेश चित्रवंश की डायरी 17अक्टूबर2016

दिल से न निकलेगी मर कर भी वतन की उल्फत
मेरी मिट्टी से भी खूशबू ए वतन आयेगी ।
           
              आजकल राजशेखर व्यास की लिखी किताब भगतसिंह: कुछ अधखुले पन्ने पढ़ रहा हूँ। बेहद बेबाकी और ईमानदारी से भगतसिंह पर लिखी गई इस शोधपरक किताब  ने सही अर्थों मे यह साबित किया है कि जीवनीकारों औऱ इतिहासकारों ने सही मायने मे भगत सिंह के साथ न्याय नही किया। भगतसिंह  की सच्ची और संपूर्ण कहानी लिखने वाला कभी न कभी कोई होगा भी? कभी कभी लगता है कि अगर भगतसिंह कुछ और समय जीवित रह गये होते  तो अपनी आत्मकथा स्वयं कहते। भगतसिंह जैसी शख्सियत बार बार नही होती। ऐसे लोग सदियों युगों मे एकाध बार होते है, सच है कि भगतसिंह ने स्वयं मृत्यु का वरण किया ताकि हम सब सुख से जी सके। पर यह हमारा दुर्भाग्य भी है कि हम भगतसिंह के बारे मे ज्यादा नही जानते बल्कि उतना ही जानते है जितना जनाया गया है। यह भगतसिंह ही नही बल्कि हमारे इतिहास के साथ, हमारे सम़य काल के साथ एक छल है जिसे साजिशन रचा गया और हमे जानबूझ कर अपने इस युगदृष्टा महान भारतीय , जांबाज क्रान्तिकारी के इतिहासबोध से परे रखा गया।
अपने समय के सभी क्रांतिकारियों मे भगतसिंह निसंदेह सर्वश्रेष्ठ चिंतक,विचारक व दृष्टा थे। वे सिर्फ आदर्शवादी भावुक व्यक्ति ही नही वरन यथार्थवादी विचारक थे और इसीलिये उन्होने आजादी के  बाद के भारत की परिकल्पना आजादी मिलने के लगभग डेढ़ दशक पहले ही कर ली थी जबकि उनके समकालिको के पास ऐसी कोई दृष्टि या सोच नही थी। यही वजह है कि भगतसिंह  आज भी सामयिक व प्रासंगिक है। आज भगतसिंह को महज कामरेड या सरदार के रूप मे देखने व मानने वालो को निकट दृष्टिदोष से पीड़ित ही कहा जायेगा कि उन्हे भगतसिंह एक समग्र भारतीय के रूप मे नजर नही आते।
   २६ सितंबर १९०७ को बंगा गॉव के चक नं० १०५, जरानेवाला तहसील जिला लायलपुर ( वर्तमान मे पाकिस्तान) मे जन्म लेने वाले भगतसिंह कुल २३ साल ५ महीने २६ दिन की उम्र पूरी कर २३ मार्च १९३१ को लाहौर सेण्ट्रल जेल मे अंग्रेजो द्वारा फॉसी की नियमविरूद्ध सजा को पूरा करने के लिये राजगुरू व सुखदेव के साथ फॉसी पर झूल गये। अंग्रेजी शासन से तो न्याय की आशा नही की जा सकती थी पर हम भारतीयों व हमारे देश के नेताओं ने क्या भगतसिंह के साथ न्याय किया? यह राजशेखर जी ने बहुत ही संतुलित ढंग से लिखा है। जब भगतसिंह फॉसी के पहले जेल मे थे तो नेताजी, मोतीलाल नेहरू, रफी अहमद किदवई, जवाहर लाल नेहरू उनसे मिलने गये पर गॉधी जी नही गये, यह सवाल मुझे पूरे समय कचोटता रहता है कि क्या एक ही उद्देश्य को पाने के लिये दो विचारधाराओं के बीच इतना अंतर स्वाभाविक हो सकता है अथवा यह गॉधी जी के छद्म महात्मावाद की एक पराकाष्ठा है। ऐसा ही सवाल गॉधी इरविन समझौते वार्ता के दौरान इरविन से अति मधुर संबंध मे बँध चुके गॉधी जी के स्वभाव व जिद पर पुन: उठता है कि जब पूरा देश यह चाहता था कि गॉधी जी भगतसिंह के सजामाफी हेतु इरविन से कहे वहॉ गॉधी द्वारा माफी की बात करने के बजाय केवल फॉसी के तारीख पर वह भी समझौते के लिहाज से हामी भरना मेरे मन मे उनकी महानता के प्रति सवाल उठाते हैं। जबकि इसके पहले गॉधी खुद ही अपील कर स्वामी श्रद्धानंद के हत्यारे की सजा माफ करा चुके थे, तो क्या गॉधी जी की सारी करूणा व सारी प्रेम व सहिष्णुता कुछ विशेष लोगो के लिये ही थी? क्या यह तुष्टिकरण व अंध महात्मावाद की स्वार्थपरक दबाव वाले राजनीति की शुरूआत नही थी ? ये सवाल किताब पढ़ने के दौरान भी व बाद मे भी मुझे उलझाते रहते है। हो सकता है कि मै गलत होऊँ पर मेरे सवाल अपने जगह वाजिब है जिनका जबाब तमाम महानताओं के रेत के बनते बिगड़ते टीलो के समान बदस्तूर कायम है।
         हालॉकि मुझे नही लगता कि किसी तरह की सजामाफी को भगतसिंह स्वीकार करते क्योंकि भगतसिह के उनके पिता जी द्वारा  फॉसी से बचाने के लिये दिये गये हलफनामे की जिस तरह से भर्त्सना उन्होने की थी व उनके लिखे लेखो मे देश व अपने मिशन के प्रति कटिबद्धता से यह स्पष्ट जाहिर होता है कि भगतसिंह अंग्रेजो के किसी भी एहसान को स्वीकार करने को शायद ही तैयार होते।
         कुछ इसी तरह की साजिश भगतसिंह के लेखन सामग्री के साथ भी हुई। मात्र २३ वर्ष की अल्पायु मे हिन्दी, अंग्रेजी, उर्दू, संस्कृत, पंजाबी, बंगला और आयरिस भाषा के मर्मग्य चिंतक व विचारक भगतसिंह ने फॉसी की कोठरी मे बैठे बैठे भीअनेक पत्र, लेख,दस्तावेज व पर्चे लिखे साथ ही साथ कई पुस्तक व पुस्तिकाये लिखी व कई विदेशी भाषा की पुस्तको का अनुवाद भी किया। बताते है जब उन्हे फॉसी पर चढ़ना था तो कालकोठरी से निकलने तक वे लेनिन की जीवनी पढ़ रहे थे। उनकी जेल मे लिखी पुस्तकों मे Idea of socialism, the door to death, autobiography, the revolutionary movement of india with short biographic sketch of the revolutionaries आदि थी। पर वे पुस्तके आम भारतीयो के हाथों तक पहुँचने के बजाय तितिर बितिर हो गई, बल्कि जानबूझ कर तितिर बितिर  कर दी गई। दुर्भागयत: इसमे भी हमारे कुछ बड़े नेताओ व  भगतसिंह के कुछेक बेहद करीबी माने जाने वालो का हाथ रहा। यह भगतसिंह के आम भारतीय के प्रति स्वीकार्यता व लोकप्रियता है जिसे प्रखर न होने देने के लिये चंद लोग हमेशा शंकालु रहे कि कही जन जन मे बसे इस देदिप्तमान सूर्य भगतसिंह के आगे उनकी छवि ऩ धूमिल हो जाये।
      फिर भी आज आजादी के लगभग ८ दशको के बाद भी भगतसिंह उतने ही प्रासंगिक व सामयिक लगते है तो उसके पीछे वजह उनके विचारो की ताजगी ही है, वर्तमान मे देश मे जो अफरातफरी दिख रही है  उसके बीच भगतसिंह याद आये बिना रह भी नही सकते। ये दूसरी बात है कि इतिहास ने उनके साथ न्याय नही किया क्योंकि इतिहास के नियन्ताओ ने समय के शिला पर उसे स्पष्ट सच लिखने की अनुमति ही नही दिया। आज जब पाकिस्तान पर सेना द्वारा किये गये सर्जिकल आपरेशन के बाद हमारे अपने नेताओं द्वारा आरोप प्रत्यारोप सबूत सेहरा को लेकर बेमतलब की बहस जारी है तो ऐसे मे भगत सिंह और भी महत्वपूर्ण हो जाते है तभी तो भगतसिंह ने कहा था
जिन्हे मर जाना चाहिये,
वे धरती पर बोझ बने हुये है
जिन्हे जिंदा रहना चाहिये
वो हर पल शहीद हो रहे हैं।

रविवार, 16 अक्तूबर 2016

कानून बनाम कानून : व्योमेश चित्रवंश की डायरी 12अक्टूबर 2016 बुधवार

गालिबपुरा में कल "नसीम पंचर वाले" ने दारू पी कर अपनी "साली" को बुरी नज़र से दबोच लिया, लौडिया जोर से चिल्लाई, चीख पुकार सुनकर नसीम की बीबी "फरजाना" दौड़ी-दौड़ी वहाँ पहुँची और नसीम की गिरफ्त से अपनी बहन को छुड़ाया।
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नसीम ने पहले तो "फरजाना" को ख़ूब लतियाया और साली को अपने पास छोड़कर फरजाना को वहाँ से चले जाने को कहा । लेकिन तब तक अड़ोसियों-पड़ोसियों के आ जाने से मामला बिगड़ गया। तो अपने मकसद में नाकाम नसीम ने "फरजाना" को बोला : "तलाक तलाक तलाक" !
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मुहल्ला गालिबपुरा की मस्जिद तक बात पहुँची.. सबने नसीम को लानत मलानत दी, लेकिन चाचा अजमेरी ने कहा कि - "शरीया कानून" के हिसाब से फरजाना का तलाक हो गया है..
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वहाँ खड़े एक लड़के ने कहा कि :- अगर "शरिया कानून" से नसीम का दिया तलाक सही है तो फिर "शरिया कानून" के तहत नसीम के दोनो हाथ और लिंग भी काटा जाए क्योंकि इसने एक नाबालिग लड़की का बलात्कार किया है। "शरिया कानून" के तहत बलात्कारी की यहीं सजा होती है ।
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पूरी भीड़ में सन्नाटा छा गया ! सब चुप !! तभी चचा अजमेरी ने उस लड़के को घुड़काते हुए कहा :- "ये हिन्दुस्तान है यहाँ "शरिया कानून" की हुकूमत नहीं चलती, यहाँ "भारतीय कानून" का शासन है, "संविधान" नाम की भी कोई चीज होती है मियाँ, बड़े आये "शरीयत-शरीयत" करने।